Introduction
-In n-person game in characteristic functiorl form [2, 31 is a pair (I, , nz), where I, is a set of n 2 3 elements, called the players, and m is a real-valued set function defined for all subsets of I, , called the characteristicfunctiorz, which satisfies i. m(0) = 0, and ii. if R and S are disjoint subsets of I, ,
We shall always take I, to be the first n integers, i.e., a labeling of the players.
The terms S-equivalence, essential and inessential games, in~putations, and coalitions will have their usual meanings [2] ; however, we shall let the word "game" mean "essential game" except when it is prefixed by "inessential". The notation used will be standard, except that we shall write z(T) for E l t T x z , where X = 11 xi 11 is a real n-tuple and T is a coalition.
Since all of our results are invariant under S-equivalence it will suffice to use one representative characteristic function from each of the equivalence classes;
it seems most convenient to use the 0-1 normalization m ( { i ) ) = 0, i E I, , and m(In) = 1.
Any partition 7 = (TI , Tz , . . . T , ) of I, into proper subsets T, is called a coalition structure. The particular coalition structure where there are no nontrivial coalitions, i.e., [ { 1 ) , (21, . . . { n ) 3, will be denoted by A, . Let k be an integer with 0 $ Ic 5 n -2 and let 7 be a coalition structure, then a subset S c In is called a k-critical coalition of T if there exists a coalition T E 7 such that 1 (S -T) U (T -S) I $ k. I t is clear that if T E T, T is a k-critical coalition of T for every k.
In an earlier paper [l] we introduced and attempted to justify intuitively the following class of equilibrium notions: A pair (X, T), where X is an imputatiorl and 7 a coalition structure, is said to be k-stable if (1) for every k-critical coalition S of 7 , m(S) 5 x(S), and (2) x, = 0 implies {i] E 7 . A game is called k-stable if there exists at least one k-stable pair; otherwise it is called k-unstable.
In [l] we presented a few general properties of the notion and we exarnined the stability conditions for 3-and 4-person constant-sum games and for all simple ~t . DUNCAN LUCE games. Here we propose to continue this program and to study the stability of symmetric games and of quota games (Sections 2 and 3). These results are employed in Section 4 to study the stability of games which are both simple and quota. The final section is devoted to a sketchy discussion of 1-stable pairs of the form (X, A,).
Symmetric games
One quite general and important class of games which has been studied in the literature is that in which the characteristic function depends only on the size of a coalition, i.e., PROOF. It is clear that (1) l / n 11, A,) is k-stable if the co~ldition is met.
Conversely, suppose (X, T) is k-stable and that m(k + 1) > (k + l)/n. Consider any positive integer a such that a(k + 1) 5 n. Since we may partition any coalition of a(k + 1) elements into a disjoint coalition of k + 1 elements, For any Ti E T it is clear that since 0 < I Ti 1 < n and 0 5 k 5 n -2 we may write
where ai and bi are integers such that O < a i ( k + l ) < n and -1c5 b i s k . ' We consider three cases: > C T , I T, I/n = I, which is impossible and so the pair is not k-stable, and the theorem is proved.
In [l] me defined a game to be negative if m(T) 5 / I' j/n for all T c I, .
COROLLARY. A symmetric game is (n -2)-stable if and only <f i t zs negatizlc.
PROOF. The theorem and the definitioil of a negative game. Shapley [4] defines the follo~ving class of games: A game is called a quota game if there exists a real n-tuple Q = 1 q,ll, called the quota, such that i. q(1,) = 1, and
Quota games
-4 player i such that q, < 0 is called weak. Since m ( ( i , j ) ) 2 0, there is a t most one weak player, and when n is odd there is no weak player. For suppose, without loss of generality, n is a weak player and n is odd, then Conversely, suppose there is a weak player, which by relabeling we may take to be n, and let (X, T) be a 1-stable pair. Label the coalitions TI , . . . , T f of T SO that n E Tt . For any T, E T, the 1-stability requirements implies m(T,) 5 x(T,). Son,, if 1 T, 1 is even, then T , ran be partitioned into 1 T, 1/2 non-overlapping t\vo element coalitions, each of whirh has the value m ( ( i , j } ) = q, + q , .
Thus, .t(T,) 2 m(T,) & q(T,)
. If 1 T, I > 1 and odd, then for every k E T i , 1 T , -( l i ) 1 is even, and so by the same argunlent
Summing over all li E l', ,
(i, k} is a I-critical coalition and so
But z(I,,) = 1 = q(I,), so with n 2 3, xi 2 qi . Since these inequalities hold for
all Ti E T and since $(I,) = q(I,), the equalities
Nest we show that if n is weak and n E T , , then I T , 1 is even. Suppose, on the contrary, I T t I is odd. If I T , I > 1, then by the partitioning argument m ( T t ) 2
But me know that x(T,) = q(T,), and since n is ~veak, q, < 0, so m(T,) 2 q(T,) -q, > x ( T t ) which violates the 1-stability assumption. If 1 Ttl = 1, then T t = { n } and we have shown above that x, = q, < 0, which is impossible. Thus I T , 1 is even.
It is clear that in -T t there is at least one k such that q, 2 x, . Consider the 1-critical coalition T t U { k } . Since 1 T t 1 is even, so is I ( T , U {lc}) -{ n } 1, and so we may partition that coalition into non-overlapping two element coalitions:
which violates the assumption that ( X , T ) is 1-stable. Thus, we must conclude that there is no weak player.
COROLLARY. All quota games with an odd number of players are 1-stable. PROOF. The theorem coupled with the observation that when n is odd there is no weak player. , T t ) , is 1-stable and that for some r, x, # q, . From the proof of Theorem 2 we know that for each T , E T , x(T,) = q(T,). It follows, therefore, that in some T , , say T , , there exist r and s such that z, > q, and 2, < q, . Now suppose that for i Z t, I Ti 1 is odd, then T , U { s } has an even number of elements and is 1-critical, so which is impossible. Thus, 1 T , I is even. If n is even, then so is 1 T , 1. Suppose n , and therefore I T t 1, is odd. Since we know that if T , = ( r } , q, = x, , it follows
which is impossible. Thus, if ( X I T ) is 1-stable either X = Q or I T I is even for T e T . Since any k-stable pair is also 1-stable, the conclusion holds for k-stable pairs. If 1 T I is even we know from the proof of Theorem 2 that m.(T) = q ( T ) =
x(T).
Next, let us assume that n is even and k 2 2, and suppose ( X I T ) is k-stable and X # Q. Thus there exists r E T , , for some i, such that x, > q, , and for any
is k-critical for k L 2 and which has an even number of elements since Ti does.
Thus,
which is impossible. Thus, X = Q.
The following is an example of a non-constant-sum symmetric quota game in which ( X , 7) is 1-stable and X # Q :
It is easy to show that 
PROOF. Sufficiency: I t is obvious that (Q,
Observe, which violates the 1;-stability condition. Thus we know that Ti -T iit 0 and is even, thus there are at least k + 1 non-overlapping sets each having a t least two elements, so n 2 2(k + I), or k 5 (n -2 ) / 2 . Thus, if 1; > (n -2 ) / 2 , the necessary condition is also sufficient. COROLLARY 2. A n y quota game wzth an odd number of players i s 2-stable. PROOF. Since a quota game with an odd number of players has no weak player, the first part of Corollary 1 implies the result.
Simple quota games
Following the defillitioli of von Neumann and Morgenstern ii. there exists an element r such that -( r ) and any coalition properly including j r j are winning, and all other coalitions are losing. PROOF. I t is not difficult to see that the simple games so defined are quota games by taking q, = 1, q, = 0, i # r, in the non-exceptional cases aild by letting q, = -1/2, q, = 1/2, z # r, in the exceptional 4-person case.
Conversely, suppose ( I n , m) is both a simple and a quota game. Suppose there exists a weak player, which without loss of generality we ]nay take to be n. I t is clear that for i # n, q , 2 0 and that there exists some r tf. n such that q, > 0. For any i # r, n, m({i, r ) ) = q, + q h > 0, so {i, r ) is winning. If we suppose that in addition to r, there is a j with q, > 0, then ally set (k, j] must also be winning. If n 2 5 , then we may choose i, j, li, r all different and different from n. But both (i, r ) and (k, j ) are winning, n-hirh is impossible. Thus, if there is a weak player then either n 5 4 or q, = 1, q, = 0, for i # r, n. In the latter case, q, = 1 -q(I, -{ n j ) = 0, which contradicts the assumption that n is weak. For n = 4, the same argument applies as above except if (1, 21, ( 1, 3 ] , and (2, 31 are all winning. In this case, ql + q2 = ql + q3 = 92 + 43 = 1, so ql = qz = q3 = 1/2 and q4 = -1/2. Thus (i, 41, i # 4, are losing coalitions.
For n = 3, the fact that ( 1, 2 ) is winning implies ql + q2 = 1, which implies q, = 0 and so there is no weak player.
We may ilow suppose the game has no weak player. By a repetition of the first argument of the proof we may show that there exists an element r such that any coalition properly including { r ] is winning. If T is any coalition not including ( r ) and if I T / $ n -2, then there exists j E -(T U { r ) ). Since (r, j j is winning and -T 3 {r, j ) , -T is winning and so T is losing. The only remaining coalition is -{ r ] which if it is losing results in a non-(.onstant-sum game and if it is winning results in a constant-sum game. COROLLARY 1. Every non-exceptional constant-sum simple quota game is k-stable .for all k < n -2 and is (n -2)-unstable. Every non-constant-sum simple quota game is k-stable for all 1; 5 n -2. The exceptional game is 1-unstable. PROOF. Let (X, 7) be k-stable. By Theorem 3 we know that X = Q except possibly when k = 1 and n is even. In the latter case the fact that n is even implies n >= 4, and so the illtersection of the 2-elenlent ~vinning coalitions is ( r ) , where r is the element described in theorem 5 . From this we may conclude by 52G R. DUNCAN LUCE Theorem 5 of [I] that X = Q. Since X = Q in all cases and since q j = 0 for j # r, the second condition of k-stability implies T = A, .
A remark
I t follows from Theorem 4 of [l] and from Theorems 1 and 2 of this paper that any 1-stable simple, symmetric, or quota game has a 1-stable pair of the form (X, A,). In t'he case of the non-exceptional simple quota games the only k-stable pair is of this form (corollary 2, Theorem 5). In other words, for these games there is a t least one n-tuple X such that i. x(In) = 1,
ii. m({i, j ] ) 2 xt + x, , i, j e I,, , i + j, and
iii. x, >= 0, and so all of these 1-stable games lie in a class of games which is a generalization of Shapley's notion of a quota game without a weak player. There are two grounds for thinking that this is a comparatively special case and that some effort should be expended to isolate classes of games which do not possess this property and to characterize their stability properties. First, there exist 1-stable games which do not have this property. Consider any (I, , m) having a set T such that i. I T I = n/2 = t, ii. for i , j e T or i, j E -T, m(]i, j ) ) > 2/n and iii. for i, j e T and k E -T, or z e T and j, k E -T, m({i, j, k ) ) 6 3/n. I t is easy to see that such games exist, e.g., a game decomposable along T mith components which are 1-unstable symmetric games. Now suppose a pair (X, A,) is 1-stable, then for i, j c T, x, + x, 2 m({i, j ) ) > 2/n. If we sum over all possible pairs in T, (t -l)x(T) > t(t -1)/2.2/n, and so x(T) > t/n = 1/2. Similarly, x(-T) > 1/2, and a contradiction results. On the other hand, if we relabel the players so that T .= (1, 2, . . . , t ) and -T = {t + 1, t + 2, . . . , n ] then the pair (11 l / n 11, [ ( I , t + l ) , . . . ( t , n)]) is 1-stable. The only 1-critical coalitions S which need be considered have three elements, two in either T or -T and the third in the other. By assumption in this case m(S) 5 3/n and so the pair is 1-stable.
X second aspect of games mith k-stable pairs (X, A,) is that one can give a plausible argument to show that such pairs are not very likely to occur in a trial and error hunting for a stable state. We shall say that a coalition structure T is k-inaccessible if for every pair (X, T') such that i. m(S) 2 x(S), S E T', and
ii. the coalitions of T are k-critical coalitions of T', then iii. m(T) 5 x(T) for T e T.
In words, we say T is k-inaccessible if for each pair (X, 7') which is "admissible" (Condition i) and for which the changes involved in going from T' to T are all "acceptable within the constraints of k" (Condition ii), then there is no "positive motive" for any of the coalitions in T to make the move from T' to T (Condition iii). I t is clear that a sufficient condition for T to be k-inaccessible is that each of the coalitions of T be losing, and so A, is Ii-inaccessible for every k. Thus, within the framework of the implicit dynamic model underlying li-stability theory we must conclude that the players either happen on a 1-stable pair (X, A,) a t the start or it will not arise, for they cannot reach it by any sequence of "acceptable" coalition changes involving only "admissible" pairs.
These comments suggest that it would be interesting to characterize the k-inaccessible coalition structures of any game and to distinguish between those k-stable pairs which involve such structures and those which do not.
